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Narrowing the LeGrand Test in New
York State
A NECESSARY LIMIT ON JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION
The unreliability of eyewitnesses, specifically with
regard to identification of suspects, is an increasingly wellresearched and documented phenomenon in criminal law.1
According to the Innocence Project, eyewitness misidentifications
contributed to over 70% of 318 convictions that were later
overturned as a result of DNA evidence.2 New York has
acknowledged this troubling controversy by being one of the states
that favors the admission of expert testimony when eyewitness
identifications are the primary evidence offered against a criminal
defendant.3 Because both judges and juries may harbor
misconceptions about the appropriate weight to give eyewitness
identification, expert testimony can be an effective way to
mitigate the harm caused by jurors’ misperceptions of the
reliability of eyewitness identification.4
New York’s current standard for determining whether to
admit expert testimony on eyewitness identifications originated
in the People v. LeGrand decision.5 In that case, the Court of
Appeals of New York held that, when a case outcome is dependent
© Katherine I. Higginbotham, 2018. The author has not granted rights to
reprint this article under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License.
Please contact the author directly for reprint permission.
1 George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission
of Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitnesses, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 98 (2011).
2 National Academy of Sciences Releases Landmark Report on Memory and
Witness Identification, Urges Reform of Police Identification Procedures, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.innocenceproject.org/national-academy-of-sciences-releaseslandmark-report-on-memory-and-eyewitness-identification-urges-reform-of-policeidentification-procedures/ [https://perma.cc/DF3J-38UF] [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT].
3 Vallas, supra note 1, at 123.
4 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 42 (2014), http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/NAS-Report-ID.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR6K-FL8M] [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
5 People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375–76 (N.Y. 2007).
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upon eyewitness identification evidence and insufficient
corroborating evidence is available, a trial court abuses its
discretion when it refuses to admit expert testimony by a qualified
expert and the testimony is relevant, based on scientific
principles, and on a topic unfamiliar to the average juror.6
Although the LeGrand test has been in use for nearly a
decade, a June 28, 2016, decision by the Court of Appeals of New
York, People v. McCullough,7 represented an interpretation of
LeGrand inconsistent with New York State case law, and
highlighted a weakness in the LeGrand test that allows for
excessive judicial discretion. The test as articulated in LeGrand
requires that the trial court engage in a two-step analysis when
a case turns on eyewitness identifications: first, the court must
evaluate whether there is sufficient evidence to corroborate the
eyewitness identification, and second, the court must assess the
relevance and qualifications of expert testimony, then admit any
expert testimony that passes the second stage of the inquiry.8
In McCullough, the only evidence tying the defendant to
the crime was identification by an eyewitness and an accomplice,
both of whom were strangers to the defendant.9 Defying the
original conception of the LeGrand test,10 the Court of Appeals
of New York declined to consider the nature of the evidence
corroborating the eyewitness identification to be a threshold
matter, stating that, “[t]o the extent LeGrand has been
understood to require courts to apply a strict two-part test that
initially evaluates the strength of the corroborating evidence, it
should instead be read as enumerating factors for trial courts to
consider in determining whether expert testimony on eyewitness identification” would assist a jury.11 Although the only
corroborating evidence available—accomplice testimony—alone
could not have resulted in a conviction as a matter of law in New
York,12 the Court of Appeals of New York deferred to the trial
court by stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to allow expert testimony regarding the fallibility of
eyewitness identification evidence.13
Because the high rate of wrongful convictions based on
eyewitness misidentification is attributable to both judges’ and
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

The standard set forth in this case is commonly referred to as the LeGrand test. Id.
People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386 (N.Y. 2016).
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379.
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 387–88.
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 375–76.
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1970).
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
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juries’ general misunderstanding of the factors that affect the
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, the McCullough
court’s deferential interpretation of the LeGrand test is
problematic.14 Even when properly applied as a two-part test in
which the weight of corroborating evidence is considered as a
threshold matter, the initial part of a LeGrand analysis that
requires that judges move on to the second stage only if there is
“little or no” corroboration for eyewitness testimony calls for
excessive judicial discretion in cases like McCullough that rely
solely on eyewitness identifications and accomplice testimony.15
With that case as a backdrop, this note proposes a return to the
original LeGrand test as a two-part analysis, and an addition to
the first stage of the LeGrand test that places an additional limit
on judicial discretion when a case turns on unreliable eyewitness
identifications corroborated only by accomplice testimony.
Part I of this note discusses the origin and usage of the
LeGrand test in New York State as a response to the
understanding that eyewitness identification evidence is
uniquely appealing to juries and counterintuitively fallible. Part
I additionally demonstrates that McCullough was an abrupt
departure from previous applications of the LeGrand test in
which the test was considered to be a two-part test, and which
should have mandated admission of expert testimony under the
circumstances in People v. McCullough. Part II argues that the
additional discretion afforded to trial judges by the Court of
Appeals of New York in McCullough is inappropriate because
neither juries nor judges fully appreciate the factors that affect
the accuracy of eyewitness identification evidence. Part III
proposes a revival and modification of the LeGrand test, based
on the fact that both eyewitness identification evidence and
testimony of accomplices have been categorically acknowledged
to be unreliable by New York State. People v. McCullough
exemplifies the need to further limit judicial discretion by
requiring judges to admit relevant and qualified expert
testimony when the only available corroboration for an
eyewitness identification by a stranger is the testimony of an
accomplice or similarly unreliable eyewitness identifications.

14
15

See infra Part II.
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 375.
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THE HISTORY OF THE LEGRAND TEST IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF NEW YORK

The LeGrand test is an acknowledgment by New York
State courts of the unique fallibility of eyewitness identifications
as evidence against criminal defendants.16 Prior to McCullough,
the court of appeals had considered LeGrand to require trial
courts to use a two-stage test in cases in which the outcome
relied on eyewitness identifications.17 Despite reliable research
demonstrating that a myriad of factors render eyewitness
identifications questionable, and the fact that wrongful convictions
have consistently resulted from incorrect identification of criminal
defendants,18 the court in McCullough appears to have ignored
both its own precedent and the uniquely problematic nature of
eyewitness identifications. The future of the LeGrand test, or any
special consideration of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identifications by trial and appellate courts in New York, is now
uncertain. By disregarding the traditional application of the
LeGrand test and treating eyewitness identifications like any other
type of evidence,19 the Court of Appeals of New York retreated from
its previous attempts to mitigate the risk of wrongful convictions
on the basis of eyewitness misidentifications. As demonstrated by
the origin and history of the application of the LeGrand test in New
York, People v. McCullough represents two steps back after one
step forward.
A.

The LeGrand Test Before People v. McCullough

In People v. LeGrand, the court responded to a growing
body of research on the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications and subsequent attempts to mitigate the effect of
this type of evidence on juries by admitting expert testimony.20
The trial court convicted the defendant of a homicide that had
occurred seven years prior to his arrest based solely on a positive
identification by one eyewitness, and equivocal identifications
by two other eyewitnesses.21 An additional two eyewitnesses
failed to identify the defendant at all, and there was no physical

16 See id. at 377–80 (discussing “reliable” research that, over the course of the
preceding decades, had demonstrated that eyewitnesses were often mistaken with respect
to identification).
17 People v. Santiago, 958 N.E.2d 874, 881 (N.Y. 2011).
18 See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
19 See infra Section I.B.
20 LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 377–80.
21 Id. at 376.
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evidence linking the defendant to the homicide.22 Despite this
lack of reliable evidence, the trial court judge refused to admit
expert testimony on eyewitness identifications.23 The Court of
Appeals of New York recognized that judicial discretion
regarding this expert testimony on eyewitness identification
required constraint, and held that it is an abuse of discretion for
a court to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification
evidence when a case “turns on the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence
connecting the defendant to the crime” and the expert testimony
is relevant, based on accepted scientific principles, outside the
“ken of the average juror,” and “proffered by a qualified expert.”24
The next time that the court of appeals applied the
LeGrand test was in People v. Abney.25 In that case, a victim of
an armed robbery identified the defendant as the perpetrator
after viewing a photo array26 on the date of the robbery, and then
in a lineup27 weeks later.28 The defendant claimed to have an
alibi, which was corroborated by the defendant’s girlfriend, her
relatives, and a daycare worker; he also submitted logbooks with
entries to support the alibi that he was picking up his girlfriend’s
daughter around the time of the robbery.29 The logbooks were
deemed inconsistent, however, and with no additional evidence
he was convicted on the basis of the victim’s testimony.30 The
trial court judge opined that there was “nothing unique” about
the case that was “beyond the ken of the ordinary juror,” and
that all of the issues could be adequately addressed through
cross-examination and jury charges.31
On appeal, applying the first stage of the LeGrand test,
the Court of Appeals of New York first noted that there was no
corroborating evidence for the victim’s identification and the
description given by the victim had not indicated that the
perpetrator had any particularly unique features.32 Accordingly,
Id.
Id. at 377.
24 Id. at 375–76.
25 People v. Abney, 918 N.E.2d 486, 495 (N.Y. 2009).
26 A photo array contains a photo of a suspect among photos of other individuals
who are not suspects. Eyewitness Identification, NAT’L INST. JUST. (last updated Mar. 16,
2018), https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/investigations/eyewitness-identification/
Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/NPV7-QV58].
27 Id.
28 Abney, 918 N.E.2d at 488.
29 Id. at 489.
30 Id.
31 People v. Abney, 867 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3–4 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
32 Abney, 918 N.E.2d at 495. The court noted that, while the logbook evidence
was not helpful in exonerating the defendant, it was not “overwhelmingly inculpatory
either.” Id. at 496.
22
23
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expert testimony by a qualified expert on the effect of “witness
confidence” was relevant, based on accepted scientific principles,
and “counterintuitive, which places [those topics] beyond the
ken of the average juror.”33 The court concluded that the trial
court judge had, in fact, abused his discretion by refusing to
allow expert testimony, on that subject, and failing to hold a
Frye34 hearing on whether “event stress, exposure time, event
violence and weapon focus” were generally accepted within the
scientific community.35
In People v. Santiago, although two other eyewitnesses
corroborated the victim’s identification of the defendant, the
Court of Appeals of New York again applied the LeGrand test and
determined that the trial court had abused its discretion when it
did not allow expert testimony on eyewitness identifications.36
After an assault, the victim identified the defendant in a photo
array and lineup, though part of his face was obscured at the time
of the attack.37 A witness who had seen the attacker fleeing the
scene with a knife also viewed a lineup with the defendant;
although he initially told police that he did not recognize anyone,
he later identified the defendant in a photo array and testified that
he had lied to police when he told them that he did not recognize
anyone.38 Another witness also identified the defendant after police
showed him a sketch of the perpetrator based on the victim’s
description.39 As in Abney and LeGrand, there was no physical
evidence linking the defendant to the crime.40
The trial court judge refused to allow expert testimony
because, although there was no corroboration for the eyewitness
identification evidence, “the topics ‘post-event identification,’
‘forgetting curve,’ ‘wording of questions,’ ‘confidence malleability,’
ha[d] little meaning” because the victim worked with an artist to
create a sketch of the perpetrator of the assault prior to viewing a
photo array and lineup.41 The judge opined that jurors could not be
educated about the fallibility of lineup procedures because they
were not “experts on constitutional law and procedure,” and that
Id. at 495–96.
The Frye test is the test used in New York to determine whether the
procedure and results of proposed scientific expert testimony are generally accepted as
reliable in the scientific community. David R. ex rel Debra R. v. BMW of North America,
48 N.E.3d 937, 941 (N.Y. 2016).
35 Abney, 918 N.E.2d at 496.
36 People v. Santiago, 958 N.E.2d 874, 883 (N.Y. 2011).
37 Id. at 877–78.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 884.
40 Id. at 878.
41 Decision on Expert Identification Witness, People v. Santiago, 781 N.Y.S.2d
627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (No. 005512003), 2003 WL 26477111, at *4.
33
34

2018]

NARROWING THE LEGRAND TEST

1065

jurors should intuitively know that memories fade over time.42
Finally, the judge thought that his own jury instructions regarding
the fact “that ‘certainty’ and ‘accuracy’ [were] different concepts”
would be sufficient to educate the jury on assessing witness
confidence with regard to eyewitness identification evidence.43
The Court of Appeals of New York’s interpretation of the
LeGrand test in Santiago was that it required a “two-stage
inquiry” in which the trial court “must proceed to the second
stage” of the test when there is insufficient corroborating
evidence and the case otherwise “turns on the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications.”44 The court suggested that when a
“corroborating identification possess[es] strong indicia of
accuracy,”45 the trial court “need not” move on to the second stage
of the test.46 In Santiago, however, the court concluded that
because there was insufficient corroborating evidence for the
eyewitness identifications, the trial court judge should have
moved on to the second stage of the LeGrand test to consider the
applicability of the proffered expert testimony, and that the
failure to do so was an abuse of judicial discretion.47
The LeGrand test is not a permissive standard in which
deference is given to the trial court. Rather, the standard
requires that the trial court engage in a two-stage analysis by
first considering the nature of the evidence connecting the
defendant to the crime, then of the nature of the expert
testimony that the defendant seeks to admit.48 The restrictive
nature of this test is necessitated, the court has explained, by a
growing field of “psychological studies that have addressed the
potential for misidentification when a person observes an
Id. at *5.
Id.
44 Santiago, 958 N.E.2d at 881 (quoting People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374,
375 (N.Y. 2011).
45 Id. at 882. The court in Santiago did not expand significantly on what kind
of corroborating identifications might “possess a strong indicia of accuracy,” but it seems
that the court will place greater value on identification by a witness who recognizes the
perpetrator of a crime, at the time of the crime, based on previous interactions. See
generally People v. Muhammad, 959 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 2011); People v. Allen, 918 N.E.2d
486 (N.Y. 2009). In Muhammad, the victim of the crime knew the perpetrator for “over
a decade,” drastically decreasing the possibility of misidentification that results from
seeing a stranger for the first time in a highly stressful and limited interaction.
Muhammad, 959 N.E.2d at 473. Similarly, in Allen, a robbery victim recognized the
perpetrator of the crime from interactions in the neighborhood, and identified him by
name when the police arrived. Allen, 918 N.E.2d at 491–92. In both of these cases, the
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications. Muhammad, 959 N.E.2d at 473; Allen, 918
N.E.2d at 496.
46 Santiago, 958 N.E.2d at 882.
47 Id. at 882–83.
48 LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379–80.
42

43
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assailant—usually a stranger—for the first time in a highly
stressful environment.”49 Given the court’s acknowledgement of
this body of research and the dangers associated with eyewitness
identifications during the last ten years, People v. McCullough
represents a troubling retreat from New York’s progressive view
of eyewitness identifications and efforts to reduce the extent to
which judges and juries give excessive weight to such evidence.
B.

The Erosion of the LeGrand Test in People v.
McCullough

By deferring to the trial court’s discretion and denying
that LeGrand is a two-stage test, the McCullough court departed
from the previous usage of the LeGrand test.50 Although the
court did not overturn LeGrand, and indeed claimed that it was
assessing the trial court’s decision using a LeGrand analysis,51
the court’s analysis appears to sound the death knell for New
York’s high scrutiny of eyewitness identifications by individuals
who had no previous relationship with the criminal defendant.
1. The Facts of People v. McCullough
On December 27, 2008, James Johnson Jr.52 observed a
car pull up in front of a barbershop owned by Vincent Dotson.53
Johnson entered the barbershop, followed by “[o]ne of the
occupants of the vehicle.”54 After Johnson and the other man
each sat in a chair, three additional men entered the barbershop
and directed both Dotson and Johnson to lie face down on the
floor.55 One of the men pistol-whipped Dotson and Johnson after
Dotson informed the perpetrators that the store did not have a
safe.56 The first man who had entered the barbershop took $200
from Dotson, then shot and killed him before all four men left
the barbershop.57 The shooter briefly came back into the shop,
49 Muhammad, 959 N.E.2d at 473. For a discussion of the factors that affect
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, including stress, see infra Section II.A.
50 People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 388 (N.Y. 2016).
51 Id.
52 Although Johnson was identified only as J.J. in the relevant court opinion,
his full name appears in a brief for the appellant. Brief for Respondent at 2, People v.
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386 (N.Y. 2016) (No. APL-2015-00148), 2015 WL 11120467 at *2
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
53 McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 387.
54 Id.
55 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 7.
56 Id.
57 People v. McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d 665, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), rev’d 58
N.E.3d 386 (N.Y. 2016).
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and Johnson heard “a clicking sound over his head” before the
shooter left the barbershop again and Johnson called 911.58 Later
that day, police apprehended Willie Harvey, who was identified as
the driver of the vehicle from which several of the perpetrators had
exited before committing the robbery and murder.59 No other
suspects were apprehended that day, and no physical evidence was
gathered linking any particular individual to the crime.60
Upon the police presenting him with a photo array
containing a picture of Jamell McCullough in the weeks
following the crime, Johnson stated that McCullough resembled
the first man who entered the barbershop during the crime,
whom he had described as being of a darker complexion and
wearing black.61 In a subsequent lineup, and during
McCullough’s trial,62 Johnson identified McCullough as the last
man who entered the barbershop, whom he had previously
described as being of a lighter complexion and wearing orange.63
McCullough was the only person in the lineup who had also
appeared in the photo array.64
Other than Johnson’s identification, the only evidence
linking McCullough to the crime was testimony from Willie
Harvey.65 After acknowledging he had a role in the crime,
Harvey identified his brother and cousin as two of the other
perpetrators.66 When initially presented with a photo array
containing McCullough’s picture, however, Harvey “told [the]
police that he did not recognize anyone.”67 Over one month later,
having admittedly seen multiple newspaper and television
stories regarding McCullough’s arrest for the crime,68 Harvey
identified McCullough in another photo array.69 Mere “minutes”
after identifying McCullough, Harvey accepted a deal in which
he pleaded guilty to robbery in exchange for the minimum
sentence allowable for that crime.70 During McCullough’s trial,
Harvey testified that he had initially lied when he told the police
that he did not recognize McCullough, because he was uncertain
Id.
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 387.
60 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 3.
61 McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 667.
62 Id.
63 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 3.
64 McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 667.
65 Id. at 667–68.
66 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 4.
67 McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668.
68 People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 394 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J.,
dissenting); Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 4.
69 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 3.
70 McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668.
58
59
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of the nature of his brother’s role in the crime.71 He noted that
he had never met the man who he identified as McCullough until
the night of the robbery, and he did not know his name.72
Despite these inconsistencies, the trial court judge denied
McCullough’s motions to admit expert testimony on the effects of
weapons, violence, and duration of an incident on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony,73 stating that because Harvey eventually
corroborated Johnson’s identification, expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications was unnecessary.74 McCullough was
subsequently convicted of murder and robbery; he appealed his
conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by
precluding this expert testimony.75 The Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York reversed the conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial after applying the LeGrand test in
accordance with the existing precedent.76
2. The Appellate Division’s Application of the LeGrand
Test
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York reversed the conviction.77 Applying the LeGrand test, the
court found that the case “hinge[d] upon the accuracy of the
eyewitness’s identification of [McCullough], and . . . that there
was little or no corroborating evidence connecting him to the
crime.”78 The appellate division noted that the proffered expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications did meet all four of the
qualifications enumerated in the second stage of the LeGrand
test: the expert testimony was pertinent to the identification,
based on accepted scientific principles, given by an expert who
was qualified, and on a subject that was outside the expertise of
“the average juror.”79
The first part of the LeGrand test was satisfied by the
facts before the court in McCullough. As the appellate division
noted, the case against Jamell McCullough turned on the
accuracy of Johnson’s identification.80 Because of Harvey’s
demonstrably poor credibility and inconsistent statements, there
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 387–88.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 11.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 5.
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666–67.
Id. at 667.
Id.

2018]

NARROWING THE LEGRAND TEST

1069

was “little . . . corroborating evidence” linking McCullough to the
crime.81 Harvey’s credibility was, in fact, questionable on two
fronts. Not only was he an accomplice with mixed motives, who
initially said he did not recognize McCullough; he also saw the
person he identified as McCullough only briefly, and in poor
lighting.82 As in Santiago and LeGrand,83 a corroborating equivocal
or inconsistent identification by additional eyewitnesses was
“insufficient to relieve the court of its obligation to proceed to the
second stage of the LeGrand analysis.”84
Had the trial court proceeded to the second stage of the
LeGrand analysis, the testimony proposed (on event violence,
event duration, and weapon focus)85 would have been admitted.
The subject matter was clearly relevant to the facts of
McCullough.86 An expert witness, a psychologist, was qualified
and prepared to testify on a presumptively scientifically
accepted principle, as well as that the proposed subject matter
was certainly outside of the knowledge of the average juror.87
Having satisfied all requirements of the LeGrand test, then, the
trial court did not have the discretion to refuse to admit the
expert testimony.
Accordingly, the court held that, based on the LeGrand
test, the trial court judge had abused his discretion by refusing
to admit the expert testimony.88 After the state appealed the
appellate division’s decision, however, the Court of Appeals of New
York upheld McCullough’s conviction with an unprecedented
interpretation of the LeGrand test.
3. The New York Court of Appeal’s Departure from the
LeGrand Test
The Court of Appeals of New York declined to adopt the
reasoning of the appellate division, despite the fact that it had
been consistent with its own prior decisions regarding the
application of the LeGrand test. The court decided that no twostage test was required by LeGrand; instead, the court asserted
that LeGrand “should instead be read as enumerating factors for
trial courts to consider in determining whether expert testimony
81
82
83
84

(N.Y. 2007).
85
86
87
88

Id. at 668.
Id. at 667–68.
See supra Section I.A.
McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668; see People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375
McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on eyewitness identification” would assist the jury in making a
decision.89 The court’s deference to the “sound discretion of the trial
court”90 diverged sharply from the previous decisions in which the
court limited judicial discretion in cases that turned on the
accuracy of eyewitness identification.91 This permissive approach
to the LeGrand standard is demonstrated in the court’s conclusion
that the trial court was “entitled” to balance the “probative value”
of expert testimony against the “prejudicial or otherwise harmful
effects” of the testimony using the factors enumerated in the
LeGrand test.92
This balancing test is an iteration of the “general
evidentiary balancing test” that is used in New York when there
is no “heightened standard” for the admission of a particular
kind of evidence.93 In fact, the court cited this general balancing
test using People v. Powell, a case that did not involve
eyewitness identification evidence, in its reasoning.94 Applying
this relaxed analysis, which notably relied on cases that were
decided before LeGrand or had nothing to do with eyewitness
identifications, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the
appellate division and held that the trial court in People v.
McCullough did not abuse its discretion.95
The corroboration for Johnson’s identification of
McCullough was insufficient and required that the trial court
admit relevant expert testimony under the original LeGrand
approach. Even putting aside his demonstrably poor credibility,
Harvey’s identification of McCullough in a photo array contained
no more “indicia of reliability” than Johnson’s, or than the
witnesses who identified the perpetrator of an assault in
Santiago.96 Because of his role as an accomplice, Harvey’s inherent
unreliability is acknowledged by New York’s Criminal Procedure
Law, which states that “[a] defendant may not be convicted of any
offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by
corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of such offense.”97 His identification of McCullough was
particularly suspect given the fact that Harvey initially did not
People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 388 (N.Y. 2016).
Id. (citing People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001)).
91 See supra Section I.A.
92 McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
93 People v. Powell, 55 N.E.3d 435, 439 (N.Y. 2016); McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
94 McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388 (citing Powell, 55 N.E.3d at 439). People v.
Powell examined the applicability of the balancing test when deciding the admissibility
of evidence concerning third party culpability; it did not touch on the subject of expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications. See Powell, 55 N.E.3d at 439.
95 McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
96 See People v. Santiago, 958 N.E.2d 874, 878 (N.Y. 2011); supra Section I.A.
97 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1970).
89

90
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identify McCullough, then did so and testified that his inability
to identify McCullough had been a lie (and that his subsequent
identification of McCullough was not).98
Had the Court of Appeals of New York applied the twopart analysis required by its prior decisions using the LeGrand
test, the results in McCullough would likely have been different.
The court’s refusal in People v. McCullough to apply the two
aspects of the LeGrand analysis that deviate from a standard
analysis of the admissibility of evidence—the mandatory nature
of the test and the two-stage inquiry—are incongruous with the
court’s previous decisions regarding eyewitness identifications.99
It is thematic in all of the previous applications of the LeGrand
test that the purpose of the LeGrand test is to address
eyewitness identifications as a uniquely perilous type of
evidence upon which to base a conviction.100 By holding that
LeGrand is not a two-stage test in which the trial court is
required to move on to the second stage of the test if a case turns
on eyewitness identifications and there is “little or no”
corroborating evidence linking the defendant to the crime,101 the
court ignored not only its own precedent, but the dangerous
implications of holding eyewitness identifications to the same
standard as other evidence. The gap between judges’ and juries’
perceptions and reality, and the pervasiveness of eyewitness
identification evidence, are why the court’s decision in People v.
McCullough has such great implications for the future
treatment of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, and
potential resulting wrongful convictions in New York.
II.

ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITY REGARDING THE
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Eyewitness statements from victims and witnesses are
powerfully compelling. As Justice William J. Brennan opined,
“There is almost nothing more convincing than a live human
being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and
says, ‘That’s the one!’”102 The weight given to identification by
such eyewitnesses is not surprising; in our daily lives, we are
rarely subject to skepticism about the identity of the parties
involved and the details recounted in our storytelling. Indeed, it
McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 387–88.
See supra Section I.A.
100 See supra Section I.A.
101 McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
102 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
98
99
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is conceptually counterintuitive to imagine that a witness—
often with no external motivation to fabricate information about
the identity of a perpetrator—could positively, and with
certainty, identify the wrong individual. The fact that
eyewitness identifications “played a role” in the gross majority
of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence, however,
demonstrates that this intuitive trust in the ability of an individual
to recognize a person that he or she encountered previously is
misguided in many cases.103 In the majority of all criminal cases,
there is no biological evidence available,104 so the danger of a false
conviction based on eyewitness misidentification remains high
despite technological advances that allow the analysis of more
reliable evidence.
Eyewitness identifications made by witnesses who are
strangers to the perpetrator, during stressful, violent, and brief
interactions are not as reliable as they may seem to the average
juror or judge.105 This tension between perception and reality
regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony necessitates a
more skeptical treatment of eyewitness identifications. Because
both judges and juries may harbor misconceptions about the
appropriate weight to give eyewitness identification, expert
testimony can be an effective way to mitigate the harm caused by
jurors’ misperception of the reliability of eyewitness
identification.106 To that end, the LeGrand test in its traditional
application—as a mandatory two-step procedure for determining
whether a trial court must admit expert testimony—provides
protection to criminal defendants against whom the primary
evidence offered is identification by eyewitnesses. The additional
judicial discretion allowed by People v. McCullough weakens this
safeguard, making it more likely that judges and juries will assign
significant weight to evidence that is, in fact, quite dubious.

103 Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT (last visited Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification/ [https://
perma.cc/B8RV-ADWV].
104 See generally JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUST., THE ROLE AND
IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 42–90 (2010), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TVX-UUKB]. This is
true for every individual category of crime except for sexual assaults, in which it is more
likely than not that biological evidence will be collected. See id. at 90.
105 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
106 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 42.
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The Reality: The Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification
Evidence

In 50% of the overturned convictions in which eyewitness
identification was part of the evidence offered, eyewitness
testimony was the primary reason for the conviction.107 In addition,
an examination of 175 exonerations of defendants—whose
conviction was based on eyewitness identifications—indicated
that, in 38% of those convictions, two or more eyewitnesses
incorrectly identified the defendant.108 This is not because so many
eyewitnesses are lying. Rather, it is likely attributable to several
common factors known to affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications; for example, the violence associated with and stress
caused by an event or the presence of a weapon, the duration of an
interaction, and post-event information all factor into an
eyewitness’s ability, or lack thereof, to reliably identify the
perpetrator of a crime.109 This means that a violent crime
committed by a perpetrator who is a stranger to the victim or
witness, such as the crime of which Jamell McCullough was
accused, is rife with opportunities for misidentifications by
eyewitnesses with even the best of intentions.
Consider, as one example, the story of Jennifer
Thompson, who was a victim of a burglary and rape in 1984.110
In a piece in the New York Times, Ms. Thompson told the
unsettling story of how, during her attack, she carefully studied
the face of her attacker because she knew that she would need
to identify him later for the police.111 She confidently described
the perpetrator to police, and identified her attacker both in a
photo array and a lineup.112 Of the identification, she stated, “I
was sure. I knew it. I had picked the right guy, and he was going
to jail.”113 Based on Ms. Thompson’s identification and testimony
that she had “never seen [Mr. Poole] in [her] life” Ronald Cotton
was convicted, even after a different man, Bobby Poole, bragged
that he was the assailant.114 Eleven years later, DNA evidence
revealed that Bobby Poole had indeed been the perpetrator of
the rape, and Ronald Cotton was innocent of the crime for which
Vallas, supra note 1, at 101.
Id.
109 Id. at 102.
110 Jennifer Thompson, I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (June 18,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/18/opinion/i-was-certain-but-i-was-wrong.html
[https://perma.cc/W5DQ-LD7E].
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
107
108
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he had been incarcerated for eleven years.115 Of course, Ms.
Thompson’s incorrect identification was unintentional; she had
no motivation to choose one stranger over another.116 She was
simply mistaken, but her mistake had severe consequences.
The violence of an event, stress level of the witness, and use
of a weapon during a crime are interrelated event factors that can
affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification.117 Although the
factors have been studied separately, they seem likely to overlap in
many criminal cases: being a victim of or a witness to violence may
induce stress, and the use or display of weapons is violent by
nature. Even viewing violence on video has been demonstrated to
impair the accuracy of eyewitness identification.118 A number of
other studies have also convincingly demonstrated that exposure
to stress reduces accuracy of identification.119 Research on
“[w]eapon [f]ocus” indicates that when a weapon is present in
“threatening scenarios,” witnesses focus on the presence of the
weapon rather than on the perpetrator, inhibiting facial
recognition and overall accuracy of identification.120 Both victims
and witnesses of violent crime, therefore, are less likely to be able
to accurately identify the perpetrator.
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that the longer one interacts
with someone, the more likely he or she is to retain an accurate
memory of the individual.121 Research confirms that the duration
of an event is positively correlated with a witness’s ability to
recall the incident and accurately identify the perpetrator.122
This is particularly relevant when the crime in question is
perpetrated by an individual who is a stranger to the victim or
witnesses; a stress-inducing interaction with a short duration
may be the extent of the time that is available to retain a
memory of someone’s face.123 Equally intuitively, identification
accuracy also decreases as the amount of time between the event
and the point at which the victim or eyewitness is called upon to
recall the event increases.124 For example, in a study in which
the subjects were asked to identify individuals from their photos,
Id.
Id.
117 Vallas, supra note 1, at 103.
118 Gary L. Wells et al. Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 45, 52 (2006).
119 Wells et al., supra note 118, at 52.
120 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 93.
121 See Vallas, supra note 1, at 104–05; Wells et al., supra note 118, at 53-54.
122 Vallas, supra note 1, at 104–05; Wells, supra note 118, at 54.
123 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 68–69. The ability to recognize faces differs
greatly depending on whether the faces are unfamiliar or familiar. Unsurprisingly, it is
more difficult to recognize a face that one has not regularly seen. Id.
124 See Vallas, supra note 1, at 105.
115
116
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the subjects made far more false identifications after a mere
twenty-four hours than they made a few hours after the incident.125
It does not take long, then, for an eyewitness’s memory to be
compromised by the passage of time. This is consistent with years
of research on what has been termed the “forgetting curve”; the
rate of memory loss is highest immediately after an event, then
slowly levels off over time.126
So, in a case like People v. McCullough, in which
McCullough was not identified by Johnson until months after
the incident,127 Johnson’s identification was less likely to be
accurate than if he had seen the photo array and lineup
immediately after the crime.128 In cases in which the only
available evidence is eyewitness identification by a stranger to
the defendant, it seems particularly unlikely that law
enforcement will identify the potential perpetrator for inclusion
in a photo array or lineup within an hour or two after the crime.
So those eyewitness identifications on which the case rests may
be even more likely to be inaccurate because of the brevity of the
encounter and the amount of time that has passed between the
crime and the identification procedure.
As time passes between a crime and the administration
of a photo array or lineup, eyewitnesses also unknowingly
incorporate outside information into their “memory” of events.129
In fact, memories of stressful events, such as those that occur as
a result of being a victim of or witnessing a crime, are
particularly susceptible to “modification by exposure to postevent misinformation.”130 Based on the information to which
they are exposed after the event, a witness may unconsciously
fill “gaps” in his or her memory with information that was
actually acquired after the incident, and which may or may not
be accurate.131 As a memory fades, and there are more gaps to
fill, witnesses may be particularly prone to incorporating
misinformation into their recitation of the details of an

Id.
See generally Jaap M.J. Murre & Joeri Dros, Replication and Analysis of
Ebbinghaus’ Forgetting Curve, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2015) (discussing the “forgetting curve”),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0120644.PDF
[https://perma.cc/M9HY-P6VM].
127 People v. McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d 665, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), rev’d 58
N.E.3d 386 (N.Y. 2016).
128 See Vallas, supra note 1, at 104–05; Wells et al., supra note 118, at 54.
129 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 62.
130 Id. at 95.
131 Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 983 (1977).
125
126
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incident.132 This is likely why individuals who are not the target
of a criminal investigation, and who first appear in a photo array
and then in a lineup as fillers, are positively identified as
perpetrators at almost the same rate as actual perpetrators of
crimes are identified in lineups.133 When a witness has seen a
suspect more than once through previous identification attempts
or through other means such as exposure to media reports, the
witness recognizes the suspect without realizing that he or she
may not have first encountered the individual during the
commission of a crime. In a case like People v. McCullough, in
which one of the eyewitnesses (McCullough’s accomplice) picked
him out from a photo array after being exposed to news stories
depicting McCullough as the suspect,134 there is a possibility that
post-event information factored into Harvey’s positive
identification of McCullough.
Criminal cases involving violence and weapons that are
perpetrated by strangers are subject to numerous factors that
negatively influence the reliability of eyewitness identifications.135
Although eyewitness testimony may seem persuasive, it is
particularly fallible in cases that involve crimes like the one in
People v. McCullough. Unfortunately, the average juror and judge
may not be aware of all of the factors that could lead to
misidentification, despite the fact that violence associated with,
and stress caused by, an event, the presence of a weapon, the
duration of the interaction, and post-event information are event
factors that have been thoroughly researched and publicized in
recent years.136 To the contrary, it is counterintuitive that a
sympathetic and seemingly honest victim or eyewitness could
consistently identify the incorrect individual. If jurors assume that
eyewitness identification is accurate, regardless of the
circumstances of the crime itself, they will place greater weight on
eyewitness identification evidence than is justified by an
established body of research that demonstrates that eyewitnesses
are frequently mistaken. This intuitively driven approach to the
assessment of available evidence will necessarily lead to wrongful
convictions on the basis of eyewitness identifications.

132 Pedro M. Paz-Alonso et al., Adult Eyewitness Memory and Compliance:
Effects of Post-Event Misinformation on Memory for a Negative Event, 31 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 541, 554 (2013).
133 See Vallas, supra note 1, at 105–06.
134 People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 394 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting).
135 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 54–55.
136 Supra Section II.A.
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Jury Perception of the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification

The high rate of convictions based on eyewitness
identifications that have been overturned by DNA evidence137 is
demonstrative of the power of eyewitness identification evidence
over a jury. This is hardly surprising, since such evidence is both
emotionally compelling and appeals to common sense.138
Although the unreliability of eyewitnesses and overturning of
convictions based on DNA evidence are topics that have
appeared regularly in the news for years,139 this exposure is
apparently insufficient to remind jurors of the counterintuitive
fact that a sympathetic witness or victim can be certain of his or
her observations, with no reason to fabricate information, and
yet still be entirely mistaken. The fact that eyewitness
identification evidence is simultaneously so convincing and so
unreliable necessitates an approach that favors the use of expert
testimony to educate juries in cases in which the primary
evidence against a defendant is eyewitness identification.
The average juror is not familiar with the functions of
human memory and other factors that can adversely influence
eyewitness identification. In one study, not only did almost half
of potential jurors believe that, when an eyewitness is reciting
his or her memory of an incident, it is akin to the reliability of a
video recording, and a large majority of jurors described their
own memories as “above average.”140 It is likely, then, that those
same juries would consider the memory of eyewitnesses to be as
reliable as they consider their own memories.141 Only 30% of
these same potential jurors believed that the presence of a
weapon, violence or stress during an incident would impair the
accuracy of an eyewitness’s memory.142 A majority of the same
group inaccurately believed that there was a correlation between
a witness’s purported confidence in the accuracy of an

INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding
of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 180 (2006).
139 See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Eyewitness Rules Ignored, Wrongful Convictions
Result, USA TODAY (June 11, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
06/11/eyewitness-wrongful-convictions-exonerate-dna/2411717/ [https://perma.cc/AG2ZRJLL] (discussing exoneration after a wrongful conviction on the basis of eyewitness
misidentification); Ruth Reiss, Wrongfully Convicted by an Inaccurate Eyewitness, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/WhatWouldYouDo/story?id=
4521253 [https://perma.cc/2ZTZ-F9RC] (same); Thompson, supra note 110 (same).
140 Schmechel et al., supra note 138, at 196.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 197.
137

138
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identification and the actual accuracy of the identification.143
Even when jurors demonstrate comprehension of evidence, when
prompted to consider factors that might affect accuracy such as
weapon focus and violence, they may not integrate those factors
into their consideration of eyewitness identifications.144
Given the fact that over 75,000 eyewitnesses identify
criminal suspects per year,145 jurors’ tendency to overestimate
the reliability of eyewitness testimony requires mitigation in
order to protect criminal defendants against juror reliance on
mistaken identification. Expert testimony like the kind offered and
rejected in People v. McCullough would likely assist juries in
making informed decisions, and perhaps reduce the rate of
wrongful convictions based on eyewitness testimony. For example,
Penrod and Cutler’s study on expert testimony and eyewitness
identification evidence found that “[e]xpert testimony clearly
improved juror sensitivity to [witnessing and identification
conditions]” that affect eyewitness identification accuracy.146 Given
the evidence that jurors do not have a good understanding of the
fallibility of eyewitness identifications, the benefit of allowing
expert testimony seems clear.147 The LeGrand test’s emphasis on
expert testimony demonstrates an awareness of its importance.
But judges ultimately make the decision regarding whether to
admit expert testimony on any subject. Accordingly, the
accuracy of judicial perception of eyewitness identification
evidence, as well as judges’ views on the effect of such evidence
on jurors, must be considered in order to determine how and
whether judicial discretion should be curtailed in cases where
expert testimony is offered to explain eyewitness identifications
to a jury.
C.

Judicial Perception of the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification

In People v. McCullough, the Court of Appeals of New York
showed deference to the trial court regarding whether to admit
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications.148 In addition
Id. at 199.
See Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness
Identification Cases, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 53–54 (1988).
145 Adam Liptak, 34 Years Later, the Supreme Court Will Revisit Eyewitness
IDs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/us/23bar.html [https://
perma.cc/9SWW-695P].
146 Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury
Decisionmaking, 52 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 76 (1989).
147 See, e.g., Schmechel et al., supra note 138, at 196.
148 Supra Section I.B.
143

144
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to being aware of the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, judges should know how juries misinterpret this
kind of evidence in order to properly assess the importance of expert
testimony. Since judges are susceptible to some of the same
misperceptions as jurors are about eyewitness identification,149 it is
appropriate to severely limit judicial discretion regarding the
admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identifications, as the
LeGrand test did prior to People v. McCullough.150
Judges may, in many instances, be more aware than jurors
of the controversy surrounding the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, but their own expertise is not a substitute for an
expert witness,151 particularly because they may not be as
knowledgeable as they believe themselves to be. Richard Wise and
Martin Safer’s study of judicial knowledge regarding factors
affecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony152 is instructive.
Wise and Safer distributed and culled results from a survey
completed by 160 judges who were members of the American Bar
Association or the American Judges’ Association.153 The study
addressed both what judges themselves believe about the accuracy
of eyewitness testimony and what they think juries understand
about the same subject.154 For example, approximately 89% of the
judges surveyed demonstrated an abstract awareness of how
factors like the confidence malleability effect,155 affect the accuracy
of eyewitness testimony, yet only 32% of the same group of judges
correctly disagreed with the assertion that the confidence with
which an eyewitness testified about an identification was an
149 Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What U.S. Judges Know and Believe
About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 431–35 (2004).
150 See supra Section I.A.
151 NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 42. The report indicates that jury instructions
may mitigate the effect of eyewitness identification evidence on a jury, “when expert
testimony is not available.” Id.
152 Wise & Safer, supra note 149, at 429–31. Wise and Safer also participated
in similar studies involving Norwegian and Chinese judges. Although Norwegian judges
were slightly more familiar than U.S. judges with certain factors that affect eyewitness
identification evidence, and Chinese judges were less familiar than both, the results were
largely consistent with the results of the U.S. Wise and Safer study. See generally Svein
Magnussen et al., What Judges Know About Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of
Norwegian and U.S. Judges, 14 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 177, 185 (2008); Richard A. Wise
et al., A Comparison of Chinese Judges’ and U.S. Judges’ Knowledge and Beliefs about
Eyewitness Testimony, 16 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 695, 708 (2010).
153 Wise & Safer, supra note 149, at 429.
154 Id.
155 Confidence malleability refers to the fact that an eyewitness’s confidence in
the accuracy of his or her statement may be increased or decreased by a number of
outside factors, regardless of the accuracy of his or her testimony. Essentially, a witness’s
confidence in the accuracy of his or her statement is not positively correlated with the
actual accuracy of that statement. See, e.g., C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The
Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. OF
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 718 (1994).
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indication of the accuracy of that identification.156 Similarly, less
than 50% of judges were familiar with the “forgetting curve,”157 and
incorrectly believed that “[a] witness’s ability to recall minor details
about a crime is a good indicator of the accuracy of the witness’s
identification of the perpetrator of the crime.”158
Although the respondent judges had practiced law for an
average of approximately fourteen years, and 76% had been
prosecutors or defense attorneys,159 many of their perceptions
about the effects of outside influences and psychological factors on
the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence were woefully
misguided. In fact, there was little correlation between either
years on the bench or whether judges had been specifically
educated about factors affecting accuracy of eyewitness
testimony and the accuracy of their answers to the survey.160
Nevertheless, the majority of judges surveyed for the Wise and
Safer study believed “that judges and attorneys know more
about eyewitness factors than the average juror.”161 It seems
likely that if judges believe that they are already knowledgeable
about eyewitness identification by virtue of their legal training,
they will be less motivated to seek additional training,
education, and clarification on the factors that affect the
accuracy of eyewitness identification.
Moreover, if judges overestimate the extent to which they
understand the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, they may also believe that misperceptions by the
jury can be corrected through commonly used judicial
interventions like jury instructions, rather than through expert
witness testimony. In the Wise and Safer study, the majority of
judges acknowledged that jurors do not generally have
knowledge of the factors that affect eyewitness testimony.162 At
the same time, only 39% of the same group of judges correctly
disagreed with the statement that juries can tell the difference
between “accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.”163 This
indicates that judges put more faith in a jury’s ability to assess
eyewitness identification than is justified. Perhaps this is why
74% and 80% of judges, respectively, would permit cross156 Specifically, those judges accurately disagreed with the statement: “At trial,
an eyewitness’s confidence is a good indicator of identification accuracy.” Wise & Safer,
supra note 149, at 430–33.
157 See id. at 430, 432.
158 Id. at 430–32.
159 Id. at 438.
160 Id. at 437.
161 Id. at 434.
162 Id. at 430–33.
163 Id. at 430–32.
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examination and closing statements to address a variety of
factors—confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias,
weapon focus, forgetting curve, and lineup presentation
format—that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification,
but were far more reluctant to admit expert testimony in order
to address the same.164
It appears, then, that in addition to their own misconceptions
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony,
judges may incorrectly believe that jurors have an ability to
appropriately judge the accuracy of such witnesses at trial. Judges
appear to erroneously place great weight on a skilled attorney’s
ability to address eyewitness credibility without the help of an
expert.165 While cross-examination is a common method of attacking
a witness’s credibility, even the most skilled attorney would likely
find herself unable to effectively cross-examine a witness about the
accuracy of her identification because inaccuracy is often based on
factors “not known to the witness herself.”166
In addition to overestimating the reliability of eyewitness
identification, both jurors and judges tend to underestimate the
effect of well-documented psychological factors that can damage
an eyewitness’s ability to accurately identify the perpetrator of
a crime. Generally, assessing and addressing the potential
unfair prejudice presented by various types of evidence is within
the realm of a judge’s expertise.167 It seems clear, however, that
the proper evaluation of eyewitness identifications is
challenging, not just for juries, but also for experienced judges.168
Criminal defendants against whom little more than eyewitness
identification evidence is offered, then, face two hurdles: the
judge’s misconception about eyewitness identifications and the
judge’s misconception about the jury’s ability to appropriately
consider the weight of eyewitness identification.169
This is not an area, then, in which it is appropriate to
defer to judicial discretion; indeed, it seems likely that this
judicial ignorance would naturally lead to judges refusing to
admit expert testimony on the subject, and also failing to give
appropriate instructions to the jury. Even if judges do give such
164 Specifically, 44% of judges said that they would permit expert testimony as
a “legal safeguard” to protect against the potentially prejudicial effects of these five
factors on a jury’s assessment of eyewitness testimony. Id. at 434.
165 Anna Lvovsky, The Province of the Jurist: Judicial Resistance to Expert
Testimony on Eyewitnesses as Institutional Rivalry, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2381, 2388–91 (2013).
166 Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications,
and the Limits of Cross Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 778–81 (2007).
167 Lvovsky, supra note 165, at 2397.
168 Wise & Safer, supra note 149, at 431–35.
169 Id. at 430–32.
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instructions, it is unlikely to be as effective as admitting expert
testimony on the same subject.170 Expert testimony on eyewitness
identification evidence leads jurors to question such evidence and
consider it more carefully during deliberations.171 A limit on judicial
discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications, consistent with the original application
of the LeGrand test, is a fitting remedy to correct for this issue.
III.

THE SOLUTION: RESTORE THE LEGRAND TEST AND
PLACE AN ADDITIONAL LIMIT ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Eyewitness identification evidence is unique in that it seems
intuitively reliable to both judges and juries, but can be highly
unreliable in the context of violent crimes committed by strangers.172
It is too soon to tell if the departure from LeGrand is a
trend or a one-time detour,173 but the retreat from the use of this
test in People v. McCullough was an error by the Court of
Appeals of New York that may have had serious consequences
for Jamell McCullough and other criminal defendants in New
York. Regardless of whether the decision was an anomaly, the
trial court judge’s decision to credit the questionable testimony
of an accomplice as corroborating evidence for eyewitness
identification highlights a weakness in the existing LeGrand
test that the court of appeals should remedy.174
Even as originally conceived, the LeGrand test still calls for
judges to exercise some discretion when determining how much
evidence is needed to corroborate eyewitness identification.175 If
judges overestimate the reliability of identifications by
eyewitnesses and assign greater weight to that type of evidence,
however, they are necessarily unable to appropriately assess how
much corroboration for the identification is sufficient to justify a
refusal to admit expert testimony under LeGrand. Judges should
be unable to refuse to admit relevant expert testimony regarding
Vallas, supra note 1, at 129–30.
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK L. REV. 1121, 1162 (2001).
172 See supra Part II.
173 The composition of the Court of Appeals of New York has changed
significantly since the cases discussed in Section I.A of this note were decided. All but
one of the judges who were appointed as of the court’s decision in People v. McCullough
were appointed in 2013 or later. See Judges of the Court, CT. OF APPEALS, ST. OF N.Y.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/index.htm [https://perma.cc/GA3Y-CY8L]. A search of
recent New York decisions reveals no cases applying the LeGrand test approach since
McCullough.
174 It is likely that, were the LeGrand test to be modified, it would be modified
by the courts, as LeGrand was. See generally People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 388
(N.Y. 2016); Legrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379.
175 See LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 375–76.
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eyewitness identifications when the only available corroborating
evidence is a type of evidence that also requires corroboration to
result in a conviction.176 As demonstrated by the result of People
v. McCullough, judicial discretion should be further limited by
requiring that judges move on to the second prong of the LeGrand
test by considering the relevance of expert testimony when (1) the
case turns on eyewitness identifications, and (2) there is little or no
corroborating evidence for the eyewitness identification(s); or, as
this note proposes, (3) the only corroborating evidence linking a
defendant to a crime is corroborating identification by other
eyewitness who are strangers to the defendant, or accomplice
testimony. Support for treating these two categories of evidence
differently already exists in New York State law177 and in the
Court of Appeals of New York’s previous treatment of the
LeGrand test.178 Explicitly requiring that New York judges treat
eyewitness identification and accomplice testimony as uniquely
inadequate is an appropriate additional limit on judicial
discretion in cases where there is no additional reliable evidence
available to corroborate eyewitness identifications.
A.

Corroboration Is Required for Both Eyewitness
Identification Evidence and Accomplice Testimony in
New York

Even applied as originally intended, the first prong of the
LeGrand test leaves too much room for the judicial interpretation
of evidence that judges may not be able to accurately assess.179 The
requirement that judges evaluate the admissibility of relevant
expert testimony by first assessing whether there is “little or no
corroborating evidence” for the eyewitness’s identification of the
defendant180 does not assist judges in determining just how much
corroborating evidence is sufficient to justify the exclusion of expert
testimony. Although the meaning of “no corroborating evidence” is
plain, “little . . . corroborating evidence” leaves room for both trial
and appellate judges to incorrectly evaluate multiple pieces of
unreliable evidence. People v. McCullough provides an excellent
illustrative example of eyewitness identification corroborated
only by evidence that could either be viewed as accomplice
testimony or an identification by an eyewitness who was a

176
177
178
179
180

See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1970).
Id.
Supra Section I.A.
Supra Section II.C.
LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 375.
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stranger to the defendant.181 But the unreliability of accomplice
testimony and multiple eyewitness identification evidence has
already been consistently acknowledged by New York courts and
state law.182
In People v. McCullough, there were just two pieces of
evidence linking McCullough to the murder and robbery:
Johnson’s testimony and Harvey’s testimony.183 Harvey’s
testimony could be evaluated either as accomplice testimony or
as eyewitness identification evidence. The trial court considered
Harvey to be a cooperating accomplice, but his testimony had
much in common with Johnson’s: McCullough was a stranger to
Harvey, with whom he only interacted briefly, and who he
identified for the first time after a number of months after the
crime.184 Viewed as an eyewitness, Harvey was unreliable
because he did not initially identify McCullough in a photo array
and only identified him after being exposed to media coverage
regarding McCullough’s alleged role in the robbery and
homicide.185 Viewed as an accomplice, Harvey may have had an
interest in minimizing his role, and maximizing or fabricating
McCullough’s role in the crime for which he and his family
members had also been charged. Through either lens, Harvey’s
identification of McCullough carried very little indicia of
reliability without adequate support. In fact, his testimony
exemplifies the reasons for the concerns that exist regarding
both eyewitness identifications and accomplice testimony.
Both eyewitness identification evidence and testimony
from a cooperating accomplice are considered to be uniquely
unreliable evidence in New York. According to New York
Criminal Procedure Law § 60.22, “[a] defendant may not be
convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice
unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the commission of such offense.”186 Accomplice
testimony is, in fact, the only kind of evidence upon which New
York’s Criminal Procedure Law specifically prohibits conviction
in the absence of corroborative evidence.187 As is the case for
eyewitness identifications, sufficient corroborating evidence for
accomplice testimony “tends to connect the defendant with the
See People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 387 (N.Y. 2016).
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1970) (regarding accomplice
testimony); supra Section I.A (regarding eyewitness identification).
183 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 3.
184 People v. McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d 665, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), rev’d 58
N.E.3d 386 (N.Y. 2016); Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 11.
185 McCullough, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 668; Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at *11.
186 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22.
187 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.
181
182
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commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy
the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.”188 Courts are
prohibited from relying entirely upon accomplice testimony
because of the likelihood that an accomplice will misrepresent
facts in order to minimize his or her own involvement in the
crime.189 For example, in People v. McCullough, Harvey’s
testimony identifying McCullough could be regarded as
questionable, not only because of his own plea deal, but because
other than McCullough, the identified defendants were all
related to him.190 The New York Criminal Procedure Law
pragmatically recognizes that a witness’s credibility is suspect
when that witness has a personal motivation for identifying
someone else as the doer, and therefore requires corroboration
to support a conviction.191
The Court of Appeals of New York has consistently found
that having multiple pieces of evidence that have a tendency to
be unreliable is not sufficient corroboration under LeGrand.192
The troubling result of People v. McCullough demonstrates the
logic of this position: if there are only two pieces of evidence
available, and both of those pieces of evidence cannot result in a
conviction without sufficient corroboration, how can each
provide corroboration for the other? The trial court’s failure to
appropriately assess the available evidence in People v.
McCullough, however, indicates that limiting judicial discretion
when evaluating eyewitness identification that is corroborated
by other eyewitness identification or accomplice testimony is
necessary and appropriate.
B.

The Addition of Categorical Limits to Judicial
Discretion Regarding the Admission of Expert Testimony

Although there is an acknowledgment by judges that
juries may benefit from a more sophisticated explanation of the
pitfalls of eyewitness identification, their confidence in the
efficacy of cross-examination and their own judicial expertise
regarding evidence may lead to an avoidance of experts when
dealing with evidence that is commonly utilized and generally

188 People v. Reome, 933 N.E.2d 186, 188 (N.Y. 2010) (quoting People v. Dixon,
131 N.E. 752, 754 (N.Y. 1921)).
189 William Donnino, McKinney Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.22.
190 Brief for Respondent, supra note 52, at 4.
191 For additional discussion of accomplice testimony and wrongful convictions
statistics, see Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to
Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 107, 110–14 (2006).
192 See supra Section I.A.
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unenhanced by modern technology.193 This is particularly true of
eyewitness identification evidence, since judges are more likely
to overestimate their own understanding of eyewitness
identification evidence.194 There is, therefore, a greater
likelihood that these same judges will overestimate how much
corroboration is necessary before they are required to move on
to the second stage of the LeGrand test. In McCullough, for
example, although Harvey’s poor credibility was undisputed, the
trial court believed that the addition of Harvey’s testimony
identifying McCullough constituted sufficient corroboration
because the judge considered Johnson to be credible.195 This
demonstrates a lack of understanding of the factors that may
adversely influence this unique type of evidence, as credibility is
not necessarily the predominant concern for eyewitness
identification by an individual with no previous knowledge of the
defendant.196 Certainly, there is no indication that Johnson had
an external motivation to identify McCullough. He may well
have been certain of his identification, but nonetheless have
been mistaken due to unknown influences and stressors.197
Because both accomplice testimony and eyewitness
identification evidence from strangers to the defendant are
acknowledged to be categorically unreliable in New York,198 the
ultimate result in People v. McCullough is inherently
problematic. The trial court judge moving to the second stage of
the LeGrand test could very well have meant the difference
between conviction and exoneration in this case, as there is no
real dispute that the expert testimony offered was relevant and
offered by a qualified expert.199 There is no dispute that the case
turned on the accuracy of Johnson’s and Harvey’s identification.200
The original LeGrand test, however, allowed the judge the
discretion to decide whether Harvey’s testimony qualified as
sufficient evidence to corroborate Johnson’s identification before
moving on to the second part of the test that requires admission
of relevant expert testimony.
The modification proposed in this note would allow no
such discretion in cases like McCullough in which the only
available evidence is eyewitness identification and accomplice
193
194
195

dissenting).
196
197
198
199
200

See Lvovsky, supra note 165, at 2387–95.
Supra Section II.C.
People v. McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386, 390, 395 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J.,
See supra Section II.A.
Supra Section II.A.
Supra Section III.A.
See McCullough, 58 N.E.3d at 388.
See supra Section II.A.

2018]

NARROWING THE LEGRAND TEST

1087

testimony. Rather, upon finding that a case turns on eyewitness
identifications, and that the only available corroborating
evidence is other identification by strangers, or accomplice
testimony, or both, the trial judge will be forced to admit the
relevant expert testimony. Accordingly, the jury will have
received effective education regarding some of the factors that
may have unfairly influenced Johnson’s identification of
McCullough. While the disposition of the case may not have
changed, the result in McCullough might have appeared far
more equitable had expert testimony been admitted.
Despite the historically skeptical treatment of both
eyewitness identifications and accomplice testimony in New
York, judicial misunderstanding of eyewitness identification and
the likelihood of eyewitness identification evidence leading to a
wrongful conviction necessitates a greater restraint on judicial
discretion than is present in the original formation of the
LeGrand test. Judges should remain free to exercise discretion
when determining whether physical evidence, a confession, or
other types of evidence constitute “little or no corroborating
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime other than
eyewitness identification.”201 It should always be an abuse of
discretion, however, to refuse to admit relevant and qualified
expert testimony when the only corroboration for eyewitness
identification is other eyewitnesses who are strangers to the
defendant or accomplice testimony or both.
CONCLUSION
Cases with fact patterns like that of People v.
McCullough—in which the perpetrator commits a violent crime
against a stranger202—are hardly uncommon.203 Although DNA
evidence proves immensely helpful in exonerating those who
have been wrongfully convicted of crimes on the basis of
unreliable evidence, DNA evidence is only available in 5% to
10% of criminal cases.204 While best practices may improve the
reliability and reduce the suggestibility inherent in law
enforcement procedures used to identify perpetrators of
crimes,205 even the best identification techniques cannot account
People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375 (N.Y. 2007).
See generally McCullough, 58 N.E.3d 386.
203 JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2014 2
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv14.pdf [https://perma.cc/N55G-25TT]. For
example, in 2014, there were over 930,000 combined sexual assaults, aggravated assault,
and robberies committed by strangers recorded in the United States. Id.
204 Vallas, supra note 1, at 101.
205 See Wells et al., supra note 118, at 59–60.
201
202

1088

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

for the effects of stress, violence, and the presence of weapons on
eyewitness memory. These factors are functions of what occurs
during the crime itself. No identification procedure can
effectively prevent the incorporation of post-event information
from media sources or other outside influences; law enforcement
officers can hardly isolate witnesses until they have a suspect
for a photo array or lineup. Nor is it reasonable to suggest that
eyewitness identification evidence should be eliminated as
admissible evidence. It is therefore the courts’ responsibility to
mitigate the unfair prejudicial effect of false eyewitness
identifications through the use of legal safeguards like the
LeGrand test.
Although identifications by eyewitnesses who are strangers
to the perpetrators of crimes—particularly violent crimes—are
unreliable, both judges and juries continue to harbor
misperceptions about the reliability of eyewitness testimony that
may lead them to assign unjustified weight to this kind of evidence.
It is therefore appropriate to favor an approach that limits judicial
discretion and tends to require the admission of expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identifications.
While the expert testimony favored by the existing
LeGrand test forces juries to consider complex issues, and takes
some extra time, it is an effective means of educating jurors and
judges about the fallibility of eyewitness identifications.206
People v. McCullough shows that, in addition to the limits on
judicial discretion in the LeGrand test as originally conceived, it
is appropriate to require that trial court judges admit relevant
expert testimony when the only evidence tying a defendant to a
crime is identification by other eyewitness who are strangers to
the defendant, or accomplice testimony. This solution is not only
consistent with existing New York law, but also a step toward
further reducing wrongful convictions.
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